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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This case involves an appeal from a judgment of the United 
States District Court for the District of New Union. R. at 1.  The 
district court had proper subject matter jurisdiction over the case 
because the issues arise under the Clean Water Act (CWA), 33 
U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (2006), a law of the United States, and fed-
eral district courts have original jurisdiction over any civil action 
arising under the laws of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 
(2006).  The United States Court of Appeals for the Twelfth Cir-
cuit has proper jurisdiction to hear appeals from any final deci-
sion of the United States District Court for the District of New 
Union. 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2006). 
 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
Whether New Union has standing to bring this case either 
under its sovereign capacity as owner and regulator of its 
groundwater or its parens patriae capacity as protector of its citi-
zens’ interests in the groundwater when New Union has alleged 
that it and its citizens will suffer injuries due to the pollution of 
the Imhoff Aquifer, which is located beneath New Union. 
Whether Lake Temp is a “navigable water” as defined under 
the CWA when it is an intermittent body of water that contains 
water four out of every five years, and there is evidence that in-
terstate travelers use Lake Temp for hunting, bird watching, and 
boating. 
Whether the correct agency to issue the permit in this case is 
the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (COE) under CWA § 404 be-
cause the slurry is a fill material due to its effect on the bottom-
level elevation of Lake Temp or the Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA) under CWA § 402 because the slurry is a pollutant 
due to its contents, which include munitions and other hazardous 
chemicals. 
Whether the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) vio-
lated the CWA when it instructed the EPA not to exercise its ex-
plicit veto power under CWA § 402(c) to invalidate the COE’s 
permit. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The State of New Union filed a complaint in the United 
States District Court for the District of New Union seeking re-
view under the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 702 
(2006), of an individual permit issued by the COE to the U.S. De-
partment of Defense (DOD) to discharge a slurry of spent muni-
tions into Lake Temp. R. at 3.  New Union alleged that the EPA, 
not the COE, was the proper agency to issue the permit, and be-
cause the EPA had not done so, the DOD’s permit was invalid. R. 
at 3.  The State of Progress, where the permitted activities will 
take place, intervened in the lawsuit. R. at 3. 
After discovery, the Secretary of the Army, representing the 
United States, filed a motion for summary judgment, to which 
both New Union and Progress responded with cross-motions for 
summary judgment. R. at 5.  On June 2, 2011, the district court 
granted the Secretary’s motion and denied New Union’s. R. at 10.  
The court held that: (1) New Union did not have standing to bring 
its claim; (2) the COE was the appropriate agency to issue the 
permit because Lake Temp is a navigable water and the slurry to 
be discharged is a fill material; and (3) OMB’s involvement in the 
process did not violate the CWA. R. at 10-11. 
New Union and Progress each filed a Notice of Appeal. R. at 
1.  New Union appeals the district court’s holding that New Un-
ion lacked standing to bring its claim. R. at 1.  New Union also 
appeals the court’s finding that the slurry is a fill material, argu-
ing that the slurry is a pollutant and thus required a permit from 
the EPA rather than the COE. R. at 1.  New Union also takes is-
sue with the court’s holding that the OMB’s involvement was 
proper. R. at 1.  Progress appeals only the court’s holding that 
Lake Temp is a navigable water. R. at 1.  This Court granted re-
view on September 15, 2011. R. at 2. 
 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The DOD has a plan in place to receive and prepare a variety 
of munitions for discharge into Lake Temp, a body of water locat-
ed in Progress.  The DOD must secure a proper permit from a 
federal agency before it can implement its plan.  The reason for 
New Union’s lawsuit is its concern that the contents of the dis-
3
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charge will contaminate an aquifer that is located beneath New 
Union.  New Union’s appeal is grounded in this same concern. 
The Lake and its Visitors 
Lake Temp is an oval-shaped body of water that is three 
miles wide and nine miles long at its high-water mark. R. at 3-4.  
Although the lake becomes much smaller during the dry seasons, 
it does contain water four out of every five years. R. at 4.  Its 
boundaries are wholly within Progress, but almost one thousand 
feet below Lake Temp lies the Imhoff Aquifer, which is located 
beneath both Progress and New Union. R. at 4.  The land between 
the lake and the aquifer is primarily unconsolidated alluvial fill, 
so the contents of the lake eventually filter into the aquifer. R. at 
5. 
Residents of Progress, New Union, and other states use Lake 
Temp for a variety of reasons. R. at 4.  For example, people take 
rowboats and canoes to the lake to hunt and bird watch. R. at 4.  
Interstate hunters in particular have hunted from boats and ca-
noes on the lake as well as navigated across the lake by rowing or 
paddling to hunt from its different shores. R. at 7.  Dale Bompers, 
a resident of New Union, lives on a ranch above the Imhoff Aqui-
fer, and although he does not presently use the aquifer, he could 
do so if he applied for a withdrawal permit from the New Union 
Department of Natural Resources. R. at 6.  The Department 
would give Mr. Bompers a preference should he apply for such a 
permit, as he is an owner of land located directly above the 
groundwater. R. at 6. 
The Department of Defense’s Pollution Plan 
The DOD plans to construct a facility to receive and prepare 
a wide variety of munitions for discharge into Lake Temp. R. at 4.  
The munitions will be combined with liquid, semi-solid, and 
granular contents to ensure that they are not explosive before be-
ing discharged. R. at 4.  Along with the inherent dangers of the 
munitions, the contents they are to be combined with also include 
many chemicals that are on the CWA § 311’s list of hazardous 
materials. R. at 4.  The DOD will then spray the dry portions of 
the lake with this slurry, eventually covering the entire lakebed 
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and raising the lake’s top water elevation by approximately six 
feet. R. at 4.  The process will take several years to complete, af-
ter which Lake Temp should return to its pre-operation condition, 
albeit at a higher elevation. R. at 4-5.  There is no evidence, how-
ever, that the slurry will not cause any harmful effects to either 
Lake Temp or the Imhoff Aquifer. R. at 4. 
The Permit Process and the Office of Management and 
Budget’s Interference 
Before the DOD can begin its project, it must secure a permit 
to discharge materials into Lake Temp from either the COE or 
the EPA. R. at 7-8.  The COE classified the slurry in this case to 
be a fill material, so it issued an individual permit to the DOD 
under § 404 of the CWA. R. at 8.  The EPA, however, disagreed 
with the COE’s characterization of the slurry, as it found the na-
ture of the discharge would require a permit from the EPA under 
§ 402 of the CWA because the slurry was a pollutant, not a fill 
material. R. at 9.  But before the EPA could exercise its right to 
veto the COE’s permit, the OMB interfered with the process and 
directed the EPA not to do so. R. at 9.  The EPA took no further 
action after receiving this instruction from the OMB. R. at 9. 
New Union is concerned with the potential ramifications of 
the DOD’s project, for it believes the discharge of munitions and 
chemicals into Lake Temp will eventually pollute the Imhoff Aq-
uifer, thereby injuring both New Union’s and its residents’ inter-
ests in the groundwater. R. at 6.  New Union therefore filed this 
lawsuit in an effort to have the appropriate agency, the EPA, re-
view the proposed project and ensure that the appropriate permit 
and review process is used before the DOD begins discharging po-
tential pollutants into Lake Temp. R. at 3. 
 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
This case involves an appeal from the district court’s grant of 
summary judgment.  Summary judgment is appropriate if “there 
is no genuine issue as to any material fact and . . . the moving 
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 
56(c).  Therefore, the issues before this Court are questions of law 
and should be reviewed de novo. Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 
5
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552, 557 (1988).  Accordingly, this Court should afford no defer-
ence to the opinions and conclusions of the lower court. See id. 
 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The district court erred in holding that New Union did not 
have standing, that the COE had jurisdiction to issue a § 404 
permit, and that the OMB’s dispute resolution between the EPA 
and the COE did not violate the CWA.  In particular, New Union 
does have standing to bring its claims as owner and regulator of 
its groundwater and under its parens patriae capacity as the pro-
tector of its citizens’ rights in the state’s groundwater.  Further-
more, although the district court was correct in holding that Lake 
Temp is a navigable water, it erred in concluding that the COE 
was the appropriate agency to issue the permit because the slurry 
in this case is a pollutant, not a fill material.  Finally, the district 
court erred when it found that the OMB’s involvement in this 
case was proper because Congress did not provide the OMB with 
the power to direct the EPA on whether to exercise the EPA’s 
rights under the CWA. 
The district court erred in holding that New Union did not 
have standing.  The court found that New Union could not show 
that it would suffer any actual or imminent injury as a result of 
the DOD’s proposed plan.  But New Union explicitly pointed out 
its injury: the pollution of the Imhoff Aquifer, which is located 
beneath New Union.  New Union also relies on the relaxed stand-
ing test the Supreme Court proffered in Massachusetts v. EPA, 
wherein affected states are subject to a more favorable test for 
standing if they can allege an injury to their sovereign interests. 
Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007).  New Union has done 
so, alleging an injury to its sovereign interest as the protector and 
regulator of its groundwater. 
Alternatively, even if this Court disagrees that New Union 
has standing under the Massachusetts test, New Union still has 
standing in its representative capacity under the parens patriae 
doctrine.  Under that doctrine, a state has an interest in protect-
ing its citizens from the pollution of the state’s air and interstate 
waters.  Here, New Union has a specific interest in protecting its 
citizens from the pollution of the Imhoff Aquifer.  The state’s in-
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terest is exemplified by Mr. Bompers, who owns and operates a 
ranch above the aquifer but would not be able to use the ground-
water if it becomes contaminated with the DOD’s slurry. 
New Union, however, does not take issue with all of the dis-
trict court’s holdings.  The court was correct in holding that Lake 
Temp is a navigable water and thus discharges into the lake re-
quire a permit under the CWA.  Congress meant for the term 
“navigable water” to have a very broad meaning; in fact, the main 
purpose of the CWA has nothing to do with navigability.  Instead, 
the term is meant to cover all the waters of the United States, 
and Lake Temp qualifies as a navigable water under either of the 
tests established by the Supreme Court in Rapanos v. United 
States, 547 U.S. 715 (2006).  Lake Temp meets Justice Scalia’s 
test as a “relatively permanent body of water” because it contains 
water much more often than not, is used in interstate commerce, 
and is very different from the waters that the Court determined 
were not navigable waters in Solid Waste Authority of Northern 
Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers.  Lake Temp also 
qualifies as a navigable water under Justice Kennedy’s test, 
which requires the body of water to have a significant nexus to a 
water of the United States.  As Lake Temp is navigable-in-fact, it 
necessarily has a sufficient nexus to navigable waters to qualify 
under this test. 
Although the court was correct in holding that discharge into 
the lake would require a permit, it erred in determining that the 
COE, and not the EPA, was the correct agency to issue this per-
mit.  The court found the slurry in this case to be a fill material, 
rather than a pollutant.  This determination was in error because 
the slurry is a pollutant, not a fill material.  First, the slurry con-
tains munitions and hazardous chemicals, both categories of ma-
terials that are included in the CWA’s definition of a “pollutant” 
but missing from the statute’s definition of a “fill material.”  And 
second, classifying the slurry as a fill material rather than a pol-
lutant would be contrary to the intent of the CWA.  Congress’ 
goal in enacting the CWA was to maintain the physical, chemical, 
and biological integrity of the nation’s waters.  Allowing the DOD 
to discharge munitions and other hazardous material into Lake 
Temp would not maintain the integrity of the lake; allowing the 
7
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DOD to continue with its project without the proper permit from 
the EPA would compromise the integrity of the CWA. 
Finally, the district court erred in holding that the OMB’s in-
volvement in this case was proper.  The EPA was preparing to ve-
to the COE’s issuance of the permit to the DOD on the basis that 
the slurry contained materials that required a permit for the dis-
charge of pollutants.  But the OMB interfered with the process 
and instructed the EPA not to exercise its right.  The CWA explic-
itly gives the EPA the right to veto the COE’s decision, but it does 
not give any other agency the power to interfere with the EPA’s 
decisions.  Furthermore, when the EPA decided not to take any 
further action, its decision was contrary to Congress’ original in-
tent in enacting the CWA.  The Supreme Court held in Chevron 
U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC that the judicial branch must reverse ad-
ministrative constructions that run contrary to Congress’ clear 
intentions with enacting statutes.  Here, if the EPA does not veto 
the COE’s issuance of the permit, it will be acting contrary to 
Congress’ clear intent, which is to maintain the integrity of the 
nation’s waters.  Allowing the DOD to proceed with its COE-
issued permit when the slurry contains munitions and hazardous 
materials would severely compromise Lake Temp’s integrity and 
essentially negate Congress’ intent in enacting the CWA. 
 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE STATE OF NEW UNION HAS STANDING 
TO CHALLENGE THE PERMIT IN ITS 
SOVEREIGN CAPACITY AS OWNER AND 
REGULATOR OF ITS GROUNDWATER AND IN 
ITS PARENS PATRIAE CAPACITY AS THE 
PROTECTOR OF ITS CITIZENS’ RIGHTS IN 
THE STATE’S GROUNDWATER. 
Article III of the United States Constitution limits the power 
of the federal courts to “cases” and “controversies.” U.S. Const. 
art. III, § 2.  Plaintiffs must meet several elements to satisfy the 
case-or-controversy requirement of Article III. See Lujan v. De-
fenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992).  “[T]he core compo-
nent of standing is an essential and unchanging part” of this re-
quirement. See id.  To establish standing, a plaintiff must prove 
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(1) it has suffered an injury-in-fact (2) that is causally connected 
to the defendant’s alleged conduct and (3) that will likely be re-
dressed by a favorable decision. Id. at 560-61.  New Union has es-
tablished that it has standing under the two theories of standing 
available to states as plaintiffs.  First, New Union has standing in 
its sovereign capacity under the “special solicitude” analysis es-
tablished by the Supreme Court in Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 
U.S. 497 (2007).  Second, New Union has standing under its 
“right [as] a State to sue as parens patriae to prevent or repair 
harm to its ‘quasi-sovereign’ interests.” Hawaii v. Standard Oil 
Co. of Cal., 405 U.S. 251, 258 (1972).  Thus, this Court should re-
verse the district court’s holding and find that New Union has es-
tablished standing sufficient to satisfy the requirements of Article 
III. 
a. New Union has standing in its sovereign capacity 
because it is entitled to special solicitude in the 
standing analysis given its procedural right to bring 
this claim and its stake in protecting its quasi-
sovereign interests. 
The Supreme Court has held that a state is entitled to “spe-
cial solicitude . . . in [the] standing analysis” when it has a proce-
dural right to bring its claim and it seeks to protect a stake in its 
quasi-sovereign interests. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 520.  Con-
gress has accorded New Union such a procedural right under the 
Administrative Procedure Act. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (2006) (“A person 
suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely af-
fected by agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute, 
is entitled to judicial review thereof.”).  And New Union is assert-
ing a stake in its quasi-sovereign “interest independent of and 
behind the titles of its citizens, in all the earth and air within its 
domain.” Georgia v. Tenn. Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230, 237 (1907).  
Therefore, New Union need only pass the relaxed test established 
by Massachusetts v. EPA to have standing in this action. 
To meet the Article III requirement of standing, “a litigant 
must demonstrate that it has suffered a concrete and particular-
ized injury that is either actual or imminent, that the injury is 
fairly traceable to the defendant, and that it is likely that a fa-
vorable decision will redress that injury.” Massachusetts, 549 U.S. 
9
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at 517 (quoting Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 560-61).  A liti-
gant in whom Congress has vested a procedural right to protect 
his interests, however, “can assert that right without meeting all 
the normal standards for redressability and immediacy.” Massa-
chusetts, 549 U.S. at 517-18 (quoting Defenders of Wildlife, 504 
U.S. at 572 n.7).  Such a litigant would have “standing if there is 
some possibility that the requested relief will prompt the injury- 
causing party to reconsider the decision that allegedly harmed 
the litigant.” Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 518 (citing Defenders of 
Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 572 n.7).  New Union is such a litigant be-
cause Congress vested in it the procedural right to seek judicial 
review of an agency’s action, and the DOD would at a minimum 
have to reconsider its implementation of its plan if this Court 
were to grant New Union’s requested relief.  Therefore, New Un-
ion needs to establish only the injury requirement to have stand-
ing in this case. 
New Union has shown that the agency action will cause an 
imminent injury to the state.  An injury sufficient to establish 
standing must be “actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypo-
thetical.” Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 560; see also Los Ange-
les v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 102 (1983) (stating the injury must be 
“real and immediate”); Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 158 
(1990) (stating the injury must be “certainly impending”).  The 
Supreme Court, however, established that a fairly attenuated in-
jury could still establish standing with its holding in United 
States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures, 
412 U.S. 669 (1973).  In that case, an environmental group asked 
the Court to enjoin the enforcement of Interstate Commerce 
Commission orders allowing railroads to collect a surcharge on 
freight rates. Id. at 678.  The plaintiffs argued that 
a general rate increase would allegedly cause increased use of 
nonrecyclable commodities as compared to recyclable goods, thus 
resulting in the need to use more natural resources to produce 
such goods, some of which resources might be taken from the 
Washington area, and resulting in more refuse that might be dis-
carded in national parks in the Washington area. 
Id. at 688.  The Court admitted that the plaintiffs’ line of causa-
tion to the eventual injury was attenuated, but it nonetheless 
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelroc/vol3/iss1/3
 2012] BEST BRIEF: OVERALL 55 
 
held that the plaintiffs had shown an injury sufficient to establish 
standing. See id. 
Here, New Union’s injury is much less attenuated, so it nec-
essarily is sufficient to establish standing.  Portions of the Imhoff 
Aquifer are located within New Union’s boundaries. R. at 4.  New 
Union has provided evidence that the contaminated water from 
Lake Temp will enter the aquifer and consequently contaminate 
its waters “because the land between the lakebed and the aquifer 
is primarily unconsolidated alluvial fill.” R. at 5.  As the Supreme 
Court held in Georgia v. Tenn. Copper Co., a state has an interest 
in “all the earth and air within its domain.” 206 U.S. at 237.  
Therefore, New Union at least has an interest in keeping its por-
tion of the aquifer uncontaminated. 
Furthermore, New Union has provided sufficient proof of its 
injury to establish its standing.  To invoke federal jurisdiction, 
“each element must be supported in the same way as any other 
matter on which the plaintiff bears the burden of proof, i.e., with 
the manner and degree of evidence required at the successive 
stages of the litigation.” Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 561.  
This case is at the summary judgment stage. R. at 5.  At this 
stage, “the plaintiff . . . must ‘set forth’ by affidavit or other evi-
dence ‘specific facts,’ which for purposes of the summary judg-
ment motion will be taken as true.” Defenders of Wildlife, 504 
U.S. at 561 (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)); see also Scott v. Harris, 
550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007) (“At the summary judgment stage, facts 
must be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving par-
ty . . . .”). 
Thus, New Union need only point to specific facts that sup-
port its injury to establish standing, and it has done so.  The Sec-
retary of the Army may claim that New Union should provide 
more proof for its allegations, but at this stage of the litigation, 
New Union is not required to provide the type of evidence that 
would be required at trial. Cf. Gladstone Realtors v. Village of 
Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 115 (1979) (At the trial stage, the facts 
necessary to establish standing must be “supported adequately by 
the evidence adduced at trial.”).  The Secretary of the Army may 
further argue that New Union must drill and sample from a grid 
of monitoring wells to establish the necessary proof of its injury, 
but again, at this stage, New Union only has to point out that the 
11
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pollutants from the permitted activity will contaminate the aqui-
fer to establish its injury.  New Union has done so. R. at 5.  
Therefore, this Court should reverse the lower court and hold 
that New Union has standing to bring its claim. 
b. New Union has standing in its parens patriae 
capacity to protect its citizens against pollution of 
the Imhoff Aquifer, an interstate water system in 
which the state has rights. 
Even if this Court were to disagree that New Union has 
standing because of an injury to its sovereign interests, the Court 
should still uphold New Union’s standing as a result of its parens 
patriae capacity.  “‘Parens patriae’ means ‘parent of his or her 
country,’ and refers to . . . the state in its capacity as provider of 
protection to those unable to care for themselves.” Steele v. Ham-
ilton Cnty. Cmty. Mental Health Bd., 736 N.E.2d 10, 19 n.5 (Ohio 
2000), cert. denied, 121 S. Ct. 1376 (2001); see also Estados 
Unidos Mexicanos v. Decoster, 229 F.3d 332, 336 n.3 (1st Cir. 
2000) (stating that a state’s interest under the doctrine of parens 
patriae “is distinct from its sovereign interest in protecting and 
maintaining its boundaries and its proprietary interest in owning 
land or conducting a business venture.”).  Under the parens pa-
triae doctrine, a state can sue to protect its citizens against pollu-
tion of the air over its territory or of the interstate waters in 
which the state has rights. See Satsky v. Paramount Commc’ns, 
Inc., 7 F.3d 1464, 1469 (10th Cir. 1993).  Here, New Union is su-
ing to protect its citizens like Dale Bompers from the pollution of 
its groundwater, particularly the Imhoff Aquifer. 
New Union is suing to protect not only the rights of its citi-
zens but also its own quasi-sovereign interests.  The Supreme 
Court has recognized the right of a state to sue as parens patriae 
but only if the state can also articulate an interest separate from 
the interests of private parties. See, e.g., Alfred L. Snapp & Son, 
Inc. v. P.R., ex rel. Barez, 458 U.S. 592 (1982).  In Alfred L. 
Snapp, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico sued in parens patriae 
to challenge what it considered to be discrimination toward its 
citizens by east coast apple growers in their employment practic-
es. Id. at 594-95.  The Court held that Puerto Rico had standing 
in its parens patriae capacity because it was representing its citi-
12http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelroc/vol3/iss1/3
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zens’ interests along with its quasi-sovereign interest in the men-
tal, physical, and economic well-being of its citizens. Id. at 608. 
In addition, the Supreme Court has long recognized that a 
“state is entitled to seek relief [when] the matters complained of 
affect her citizens at large.” Missouri v. Illinois, 180 U.S. 208, 237 
(1901).  Other courts have also expressly held that a state can sue 
in parens patriae to protect its citizenry from damage to the 
state’s groundwater. See New Hampshire v. Hess Corp., 20 A.3d 
212, 215 (N.H. 2011) (holding that a state can sue to recover 
damages to its groundwater under parens patriae); United States 
v. Hooker Chem. & Plastics Corp., 739 F. Supp. 125, 132 
(W.D.N.Y. 1990) (holding that the state of New York could sue on 
behalf of the general public as the trustee of the natural resources 
of the state, including its groundwater).  The Court of Appeals for 
the Tenth Circuit, in particular, has stated there is no doubt that 
states manage the public waters within their borders as trustees 
for their people and are thus authorized to institute lawsuits to 
protect those waters on the people’s behalf. New Mexico v. Gen. 
Elec. Co., 467 F.3d 1223, 1243 (10th Cir. 2006). 
Similarly, New Union is suing to protect its citizens’ inter-
ests, exemplified by Dale Bompers, and its own quasi-sovereign 
interests in the economic well-being of its citizens.  Dale Bompers 
owns, operates, and lives on a ranch located above the Imhoff Aq-
uifer. R. at 6.  The contamination of the aquifer would lower the 
property value of his land, causing him economic harm. R. at 6.  
New Union’s quasi-sovereign interest in the economic well-being 
of its citizens establishes its standing to sue as Bompers’ repre-
sentative to maintain his property’s value. 
Furthermore, New Union also has an interest in protecting 
its interstate waters from pollution because it could affect the 
physical health of New Union’s citizens.  As the Tenth Circuit 
held in Satsky v. Paramount Communications, Inc., a state has 
the right to sue under parens patriae to protect its citizens from 
the pollution of the state’s waters. 7 F.3d at 1469.  The pollution 
of the aquifer would essentially prohibit Bompers from ever using 
the groundwater in any capacity, and if he were ever to use the 
aquifer, it could adversely affect his health.  New Union’s interest 
in protecting Bompers, and citizens like him, is sufficient to es-
tablish its standing under the parens patriae doctrine.  Therefore, 
13
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this Court should reverse the district court’s holding and hold 
that New Union has standing to bring its claim. 
 
 
 
II. THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE’S PLAN TO 
DISCHARGE SLURRY INTO LAKE TEMP 
REQUIRES A PERMIT UNDER THE CLEAN 
WATER ACT BECAUSE LAKE TEMP IS A 
NAVIGABLE WATER. 
The CWA makes it unlawful to discharge dredged or fill ma-
terial into navigable waters without a permit. 33 U.S.C. §§ 
1311(a), 1342(a) (2006).  The CWA defines “navigable waters” as 
“the waters of the United States, including the territorial seas.”  
33 U.S.C. § 1362(7) (2006).  The COE defines “waters of the Unit-
ed States” as, essentially, “[a]ll waters which are currently used, 
were used in the past, or may be susceptible to use in interstate 
or foreign commerce . . . .” 40 C.F.R. § 122.2 (2011).  The DOD 
must obtain a proper permit under the CWA to discharge its pro-
posed slurry into Lake Temp because its susceptibility to use in 
interstate commerce makes it a navigable water.  First, Lake 
Temp is the type of water that Congress intended the term to 
cover, and it differs from the disputed waters in Solid Waste 
Agency of Northern Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 
531 U.S. 159 (2001) [hereinafter SWANCC].  Second, Lake Temp 
meets both of the tests proffered by Supreme Court Justices Scal-
ia and Kennedy in Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715 (2006).  
Therefore, this Court should affirm the lower court’s decision and 
hold that the DOD was required to obtain a permit for this project 
because Lake Temp is a navigable water under the CWA. 
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a. Lake Temp is a navigable water given Congress’ 
broad intentions for the term and the lake’s 
dissimilarities from the disputed waters at issue in 
Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. U.S. 
Army Corps of Engineers. 
Prior to the enactment of the CWA, courts interpreted the 
phrase “navigable waters” to refer to interstate waters that were 
“navigable in fact” or readily susceptible of being rendered so, 
meaning that the waters could be used as interstate highways.  
See United States v. Appalachian Elec. Power Co., 311 U.S. 377, 
406 (1940); The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. 557 (1870).  But by enacting 
the CWA and defining “navigable waters” as “the waters of the 
United States,” Congress expressed its intention for the term to 
have a broader meaning than that used in ordinary language.  
See 118 Cong. Rec. 9124-25 (Oct. 4, 1972) (remarks of Rep. 
Dingell) (“It means all ‘the waters of the United States’ in a geo-
graphical sense.  It does not mean ‘navigable waters of the United 
States’ in the technical sense as we sometimes see in some 
laws.”).  The report accompanying the proposed bill explicitly 
stated that the House Committee “fully intend[ed] that the term 
‘navigable waters’ be given the broadest possible constitutional 
interpretation unencumbered by agency determinations which 
have been made or may be made for administrative purposes.”  
H.R. Rep. No. 91-911, at 131 (1972). 
Furthermore, Congress specifically opted to broaden the def-
inition of navigable water when it defined the term in the CWA.  
The original version of the CWA adopted by the House of Repre-
sentatives defined “navigable waters” as “the navigable waters of 
the United States . . . .” H.R. 11896, 92d Cong. § 502(8) (1971) 
(emphasis added).  But when Congress passed the final version of 
the CWA, it had deleted the word “navigable” from the definition, 
ultimately defining the term as simply “the waters of the United 
States.” See 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7) (1972); see also SWANCC, 531 
U.S. at 181 n.7 (emphasis added).  This deletion indicates that 
“the goals of the 1972 statute have nothing to do with navigation 
at all.” SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 181. 
In fact, the goal of the CWA is “to restore and maintain the 
chemical, physical and biological integrity of the Nation’s waters.” 
33 U.S.C. § 1251 (2006).  Progress relies on Justice Scalia’s opin-
15
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ion in Rapanos and the majority’s opinion in SWANCC to urge 
this Court to place too much significance on the word “navigable.”  
But Congress itself was not concerned with navigability when it 
passed the CWA; its major concern was the pollution of the na-
tion’s waters. See id.  For that reason, Congress chose not to limit 
navigable waters in any way other than to define them as the 
“waters of the United States.” 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7) (2006).  Courts 
have since upheld the COE’s broad interpretations of the term 
and generally found the COE’s jurisdiction to extend to a great 
many of the United States’ waters, even “waters” that are not 
navigable in any traditional sense. See, e.g., United States v. Eid-
son, 108 F.3d 1336 (11th Cir. 1997) (classifying a storm sewer 
that wastewater was emptied into as navigable water); United 
States v. Earth Sci., Inc., 599 F.2d 368 (10th Cir. 1979) (holding a 
stream that supported trout and beaver and that was used for ag-
ricultural irrigation, but was not navigable in fact or used to 
transport goods or materials, to be navigable water). 
The Supreme Court has agreed that this broad interpretation 
is commensurate with Congress’ intentions.  The Court first dis-
cussed the definition of navigable waters in United States v. Riv-
erside Bayview Homes, Inc., when it addressed an action brought 
by the COE to enjoin an owner of wetlands from filling them 
without the permission of the COE. 474 U.S. 121 (1985).  The 
Court was hesitant to extend the term to cover wetlands, stating 
“it is one thing to recognize that Congress intended to allow regu-
lation of waters that might not satisfy traditional tests of naviga-
bility; it is another to assert that Congress intended to abandon 
traditional notions of ‘waters’ and include in that term ‘wetlands’ 
as well.” Id. at 133.  Nonetheless, the Court held that it was rea-
sonable for the COE to interpret the term to encompass “wetlands 
adjacent to waters as more conventionally defined” given the “ev-
ident breadth of congressional concern for protection of water 
quality and aquatic ecosystems.” Id.  The Court even went so far 
as to state that “the term ‘navigable’ as used in the Act is of lim-
ited import.” Id. (emphasis added). 
Progress relies on the Court’s interpretation of navigable wa-
ter in its two cases since Riverside, SWANCC and Rapanos, to ar-
gue that Lake Temp is not a navigable water.  But neither of 
these cases requires such a holding.  In SWANCC, the Court de-
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clined to extend the COE’s jurisdiction to abandoned sand and 
gravel pits in northern Illinois that provided habitats for migra-
tory birds. 531 U.S. at 162.  In particular, the Court concluded 
that the CWA did not support the COE’s “Migratory Bird Rule,” 
which had extended the COE’s jurisdiction to waters “[w]hich are 
or would be used as [a] habitat by . . . migratory birds which cross 
state lines.” Id. at 164.  The Court further explained that River-
side was not applicable to the case before it because in Riverside, 
the Court was informed by “the significant nexus between the 
wetlands and ‘navigable waters.’” Id. at 167.  There was no such 
nexus between the pits in SWANCC and any navigable waters, so 
the Court held the pits were not navigable waters. See id. 
There is also no nexus between the pits in SWANCC and 
Lake Temp.  The disputed waters in SWANCC were “a scattering 
of permanent and seasonal ponds of varying size (from under one-
tenth of an acre to several acres) and depth (from several inches 
to several feet).” Id. at 163.  Lake Temp is not a scattering of 
small ponds: it is a lake. R. at 3.  At its high-water mark, it is 
three miles wide and nine miles long. R. at 3-4.  The Court held 
the ponds in SWANCC to not be navigable waters because they 
had no significant nexus to navigable waters; Lake Temp is itself 
a navigable water, so its nexus could not be any more significant.  
Moreover, in SWANCC, the COE had to rely on its self-
propagated Migratory Bird Rule to establish jurisdiction. 531 
U.S. at 164.  In this case, the COE need not rely on that overruled 
regulation: Lake Temp is used not only by migratory birds, but 
also by interstate travelers for hunting and bird watching. R. at 
4.  Therefore, the disputed waters in SWANCC are not so similar 
to Lake Temp as to require the same result, and this Court 
should uphold the lower court’s determination that Lake Temp is 
a navigable water. 
b. Lake Temp also qualifies as a navigable water 
under either test promulgated in Rapanos v. United 
States because it is a relatively permanent body of 
water and is navigable in the traditional sense. 
The second case Progress relies on to dispute Lake Temp’s 
qualification as a navigable water is Rapanos v. United States, 
547 U.S. 715 (2006).  Rapanos resulted in a fractured opinion, 
17
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with a plurality opinion written by Justice Scalia, a dissent au-
thored by Justice Stevens, and a concurrence in the judgment 
from Justice Kennedy. See id.  Determining which holding is the 
controlling opinion of the Supreme Court in Rapanos is a difficult 
task.  “When a fragmented Court decides a case and no single ra-
tionale explaining the result enjoys the assent of five Justices, 
‘the holding of the Court may be viewed as that position taken by 
those Members who concurred in the judgments on the narrowest 
grounds . . . .’” Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977) 
(quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 n.15 (1976)).  The 
circuit courts that have applied Rapanos have differed as to 
which opinion, Justice Scalia’s or Justice Kennedy’s, is the nar-
rowest ground and thus the controlling opinion. Compare United 
States v. Robison, 505 F.3d 1208 (11th Cir. 2007) (applying Ken-
nedy’s), and N. Cal. River Watch v. City of Healdsburg, 496 F.3d 
993 (9th Cir. 2007) (applying Kennedy’s), and United States v. 
Gerke Excavating, Inc., 464 F.3d 723 (7th Cir. 2006) (applying 
Kennedy’s), with United States v. Johnson, 467 F.3d 56 (1st Cir. 
2006) (applying Scalia’s).  In fact, there is no need to determine 
which test is the appropriate test for this Court to correctly label 
Lake Temp: the lake is a navigable water under either Justice 
Scalia’s or Justice Kennedy’s analysis. 
Under the plurality’s test in Rapanos, “the phrase ‘the waters 
of the United States’ includes only those relatively permanent, 
standing or continuously flowing bodies of water ‘forming geo-
graphic features’ that are described in ordinary parlance as 
‘streams[,] . . . oceans, rivers, [and] lakes . . .’” and “only those 
wetlands with a continuous surface connection to bodies that are 
‘waters of the United States’ in their own right.” Rapanos, 547 
U.S. at 739 (emphases added).  Lake Temp does not need to meet 
the latter criterion because it meets the former. 
Lake Temp is a relatively permanent body of water.  The 
word “relatively” means “in relation, comparison, or proportion to 
something else.” Webster’s New International Dictionary 2882 
(2d ed. 1934).  Just as Progress and the majority of the Rapanos 
Court insisted that the word “navigable” carries significant 
weight, so too does the word “relatively” in Justice Scalia’s defini-
tion of a navigable water.  In Rapanos, Justice Scalia listed, with 
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some incredulity, the types of waters that courts had upheld the 
COE’s jurisdiction over: 
intermittent flow of surface water through approximately 2.4 
miles of natural streams and manmade ditches; a “roadside 
ditch” . . .; irrigation ditches and drains . . .; and . . . the “washes 
and arroyos” of an “arid development site,” located in the middle 
of the desert, through which “water courses . . . during periods of 
heavy rain.” 
Id. at 727 (citations omitted).  All of these examples have one 
thing in common: they rarely contain water. See id.  Lake Temp is 
not similar to these waters, which the Rapanos plurality would 
have held to be outside the COE’s jurisdiction.  The record does 
state that Lake Temp is “wholly dry approximately one out of five 
years,” but that necessarily indicates that it contains water four 
out of five years. R. at 4.  With that description, Lake Temp, rela-
tive to the ditches, washes, and arroyos that Justice Scalia would 
not qualify as navigable waters, is a relatively permanent body of 
water. 
Lake Temp is also a larger and more permanent body of wa-
ter than the waters that at least one federal circuit court held to 
be navigable water since the Rapanos decision.  In Northern Cali-
fornia River Watch v. City of Healdsburg, the Ninth Circuit char-
acterized a pond that was created when a rock quarry pit was 
filled with water to be a navigable water under the CWA. 496 
F.3d at 1000.  That pond was only one half mile in length and a 
quarter mile in breadth, whereas Lake Temp is many times larg-
er. See id.; R. at 3.  There was also no evidence that any people 
ever used the pond, whereas Lake Temp receives many visitors 
during the wet season for hunting and bird watching. See id.; R. 
at 4. 
In addition, Lake Temp differs from waters that Justice Scal-
ia sought to exclude from navigable waters because it is also nav-
igable in fact.  Its shores contain clearly visible trails that indi-
cate the public uses the lake to hunt, bird watch, and boat. R. at 
4.  The lower court also found that “interstate hunters . . . have 
hunted from boats and canoes on the lake and have rowed or 
paddled across the lake to hunt from the shore opposite the high-
19
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way.” R. at 7.  Therefore, Lake Temp qualifies as a navigable wa-
ter under the plurality’s test in Rapanos. 
Additionally, because Lake Temp is navigable in fact, it nec-
essarily meets Justice Kennedy’s “significant nexus” test for nav-
igable waters.  This test requires a significant nexus between the 
water at issue and a navigable water if the former is not a tradi-
tionally navigable water in its own right. See Rapanos, 547 U.S. 
at 759.  The lower court held Lake Temp to be “within the de-
scription of water bodies that have been traditionally held navi-
gable because of use by interstate travelers.” R. at 7.  Traditional-
ly, courts held waters to be navigable waters because they were 
navigable in fact. United States v. Appalachian Elec. Power Co., 
311 U.S. 377, 406 (1940) (defining navigable waters as those that 
could be used as interstate highways); The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. 
557 (1870) (defining navigable waters as those waters that allow 
vessels to engage in interstate trade).  Lake Temp is a tradition-
ally navigable water because the facts indicate that individuals 
have used Lake Temp to hunt and bird watch in the past. R. at 7.  
The Supreme Court has specifically “held that ‘nonnavigable, iso-
lated, intrastate waters’ . . . [that do] not ‘actually abu[t] on a 
navigable highway’ [are] not included as ‘waters of the United 
States.’” Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 726 (quoting SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 
167-68, 171) (alteration in original).  Lake Temp is an isolated 
and intrastate water, but it is navigable because interstate hunt-
ers have rowed or canoed across it to hunt on its shore opposite 
the highway. R. at 3, 7.  Furthermore, the closest navigable 
highway is less than 100 feet from its shore. R. at 4.  Such a body 
of water is a navigable water.  And as a navigable water, Lake 
Temp meets Justice Kennedy’s test; it needs no significant nexus 
to a navigable water because it is such a water itself. 
For these reasons, this Court should affirm the lower court’s 
decision and hold that the DOD was required to obtain a permit 
for this project because Lake Temp is a navigable water under 
the CWA. 
III. THE CORPS OF ENGINEERS DOES NOT HAVE 
THE JURISDICTION TO ISSUE A PERMIT 
UNDER § 404 OF THE CLEAN WATER ACT 
BECAUSE PROPER JURISDICTION BELONGS 
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TO THE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 
AGENCY UNDER § 402 OF THE CLEAN WATER 
ACT. 
Under the CWA, an individual seeking to discharge material 
into a navigable water of the United States must apply for a per-
mit to do so from either the COE or the EPA. 33 U.S.C. §§ 
1344(a), 1342(a) (2006).  If the material the individual seeks to 
discharge is a fill material, the appropriate agency is the COE.  
33 U.S.C. § 1344(a) (2006).  If the material is a pollutant, howev-
er, the appropriate agency is the EPA. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a) (2006).  
In this case, the DOD is seeking to discharge a wide variety of 
munitions and hazardous chemicals into Lake Temp, so the ap-
propriate agency from which DOD must seek its permit is the 
EPA. See id.  Therefore, this Court should reverse the ruling of 
the lower court and hold that the DOD’s § 404 permit for dis-
charging its slurry into Lake Temp is invalid because the COE 
was not the appropriate agency to issue the permit. 
 
 
a. The slurry that the Department of Defense seeks to 
discharge in this case is a pollutant, not a fill 
material. 
Under § 1342(a) of the CWA, an individual seeking a “permit 
for the discharge of any pollutant, or combination of pollutants,” 
must apply for the permit with the EPA. Id.  The CWA defines 
“pollutant,” in relevant part, as “munitions, chemical wastes, . . . 
[and] rock . . . .” 33 U.S.C. § 1362(6) (2006).  An individual seek-
ing a “permit[] . . . for the discharge of dredged or fill material . . 
.,” however, may apply for the permit with the COE. 33 U.S.C. § 
1344(a) (2006).  Here, the DOD is seeking to discharge slurry con-
taining munitions, hazardous chemicals, and rock, all listed ex-
amples of pollutants, into Lake Temp, and therefore the slurry is 
a pollutant requiring a permit from the EPA before the DOD can 
discharge it into Lake Temp. 
The CWA does not define the term “fill material,” but the 
COE and the EPA have agreed on a definition for the term in 
their regulations.  The two agencies define “fill material” as “ma-
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terial placed in waters of the United States where the material 
has the effect of: (i) Replacing any portion of a water of the United 
States with dry land; or (ii) Changing the bottom elevation of any 
portion of a water of the United States.” 40 C.F.R. § 122.2 (2011) 
(EPA’s definition); 33 C.F.R. § 323.2(e) (2011) (COE’s definition).  
The agencies list “rock, sand, soil, clay, plastics, construction de-
bris, wood chips, overburden from mining or other excavation ac-
tivities, and materials used to create any structure or infrastruc-
ture in the waters of the United States” as examples of fill 
materials. Id.  Neither list of examples includes munitions or 
hazardous chemicals. See id.  The examples listed under the defi-
nition of pollutants in the CWA, however, include both munitions 
and hazardous chemicals. 33 U.S.C. § 1344(a) (2006). 
The COE’s definition of a fill material was not always contin-
gent on the effect of the material on the targeted water.  Prior to 
2002, “the COE’s definition of fill material expressly provided 
that fill material did ‘not include any pollutant discharged into 
the water primarily to dispose of waste’ . . . .” Kory R. Watson, 
Comment, Fill Material Pollution Under the Clean Water Act: A 
Need for Legislative Change, 35 S. Ill. U. L.J. 335, 345 (2011) 
(quoting 35 C.F.R. § 323.2 (2001)).  The COE was concerned with 
protecting the waters of the United States from pure waste mate-
rial. See id.  But in 2002, amid concerns that the regulations were 
overbroad, the COE and the EPA issued new regulations that 
changed the analysis of whether a material was a fill material 
from a purpose-based test to an effects-based test. See Final Revi-
sions to the Clean Water Act Regulatory Definitions of “Fill Ma-
terial” and “Discharge of Fill Material,” 67 Fed. Reg. 31,129, 
31,133 (May 9, 2002) (to be codified at 33 C.F.R. pt. 323 and 40 
C.F.R. pt. 232).  The agencies explained that one of the reasons 
for the change in the regulations was to promote consistency in 
categorizing discharges as fill materials: 
An objective, effects-based standard also helps ensure that dis-
charges with similar environmental effects will be treated in a 
similar manner under the regulatory program.  The subjective, 
purpose-based standard led in some cases to inconsistent treat-
ment of similar discharges, a result which hampers effective im-
plementation of the statute. 
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Id.  Although the agencies’ reasoning for the change was reason-
able in theory, in practice the new definition set up the possibility 
of “a grave danger that chemically hazardous [material would] be 
permitted as fill material . . .” because of the COE’s strict adher-
ence to the new regulations. Watson, supra, at 345. 
The Supreme Court faced an example of that grave danger in 
Coeur Alaska, Inc. v. Southeast Alaska Council, 557 U.S. 261 
(2009).  In that case, the COE granted a § 404 permit to a gold 
mining company seeking to discharge a slurry of crushed rock 
and water from a froth-flotation mill into a lake protected by the 
CWA. Id. at 2464.  The majority of the Court focused on the effect 
of the slurry in determining that it was a fill material, and not a 
pollutant, and it upheld the COE’s grant of the permit. Id. at 
2463 (holding the slurry to be fill material “because it would have 
the effect of raising the lake’s bottom elevation”).  The majority 
acknowledged there could be extreme cases where the COE’s in-
terpretation would “lead to § 404 permits authorizing the dis-
charges of other solids that are now restricted by EPA standards,” 
but it declined to decide that issue because no such extreme in-
stance was before it. Id. at 2468. 
The dissent, on the other hand, was very concerned with the 
majority’s approach to interpreting the term “fill material.” See 
id. at 2483 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).  In particular, the dissent 
felt that the majority’s narrow reading would allow “[w]hole cate-
gories of regulated industries . . . [to] gain immunity from a varie-
ty of pollution-control standards.” Id. (“A discharge of a pollutant, 
otherwise prohibited by firm statutory command, becomes lawful 
if it contains sufficient solid matter to raise the bottom of a water 
body, transformed into a waste disposal facility.”).  The dissent 
was concerned that the majority’s reading of the regulations and 
statute would create a loophole for polluters. See id. 
Here, the DOD is attempting to take advantage of that loop-
hole.  The DOD claims, and the lower court erroneously agreed, 
that its slurry is covered by the majority’s decision in Coeur. R. at 
8.  But the slurry in Coeur and the slurry in this case are marked-
ly different.  The slurry in Coeur consisted solely of crushed rock 
and water; the slurry in this case consists of munitions and chem-
icals, in addition to rock and water. R. at 4.  The relevant defini-
tions in the statutes and regulations provide examples of fill ma-
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terial and pollutants, but whereas munitions and chemicals are 
not included in the examples of fill material, they are explicitly 
included in the examples of pollutants. See 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7) 
(2006).  Moreover, the chemicals the DOD plans to mix with the 
munitions include many chemicals that are on the CWA’s list of 
hazardous substances. R. at 4.  The slurry in this case is far more 
dangerous for the environment than the slurry in Coeur, so the 
procedure for obtaining a permit under the CWA for the dis-
charge of such a pollutant requires a permit from the EPA, not 
the COE. 
b. Labeling the slurry in this case as a fill material 
rather than a pollutant is antithetical to the explicit 
goal of the Clean Water Act. 
More importantly, classifying the slurry in this case as a fill 
material flies in the face of the goals of the CWA.  The explicit 
purpose of the CWA is “to restore and maintain the chemical, 
physical and biological integrity” of the waters of the United 
States. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (2006).  The CWA’s drafters stated, 
“The use of any river, lake, stream or ocean as a waste treatment 
system is unacceptable.” S. Rep. No. 92-414, at 7 (1971).  The dis-
senters in Coeur were particularly outraged with the majority’s 
decision, explaining that “[t]he use of waters of the United States 
as ‘settling ponds’ for harmful mining waste . . . is antithetical to 
the text, structure, and purpose of the Clean Water Act.” Coeur, 
557 U.S. at 304 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).  Similarly, classifying 
the discharge of the DOD’s slurry in this case as the discharge of 
a fill material would be irreconcilable with the CWA’s stated pur-
pose. 
Congress enacted the CWA in 1972 with the goal of eliminat-
ing the discharge of pollutants into the nation’s waters by 1985.  
33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (2006).  In line with that goal, the COE and 
EPA initially excluded as fill material any pollutant that was dis-
charged primarily to dispose of waste. See 33 C.F.R. § 323.2 
(2001).  Although the agencies have since changed their technical 
definitions of the term, the purpose behind the CWA has not 
changed at all. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (2006).  The agencies also con-
tinue to recognize this purpose, as evidenced by their continued 
exclusion of “trash or garbage” from their definitions of fill mate-
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rial. See 33 C.F.R. § 323.2 (2011); 40 C.F.R. § 232.2 (2011).  Thus, 
even as definitions in the CWA may change, its stated purpose 
should continue to guide agencies and courts in their decisions. 
The Coeur majority, however, appeared to lose sight of this 
purpose.  In coming to its decision, the majority ignored the fact 
that “the discharge would kill all of the lake’s fish and nearly all 
of its other aquatic life.” Coeur, 557 U.S. at 297.  The majority al-
so paid little heed as to whether aquatic life could ever inhabit 
the lake again. See id. at n.1.  Killing all of the aquatic life in a 
lake cannot be commensurate with the goal of maintaining a wa-
ter’s “physical, chemical and biological integrity.” See 33 U.S.C. § 
1251(a) (2006).  Such an act is inapposite to the CWA’s goals. 
Here, the DOD and the COE have also ignored the CWA’s 
stated purpose.  Dumping munitions and chemicals, many of 
which are among the hazardous substances listed in CWA § 311, 
will very likely disrupt Lake Temp’s chemical integrity, if not also 
its physical and biological integrity.  New Union presented evi-
dence, and neither the parties nor the lower court contested, that 
the discharge of the slurry into Lake Temp will contaminate its 
waters. R. at 5.  The lower court referred unflinchingly to “the 
pollution” of the lake when discussing the issue of New Union’s 
standing in this case. R. at 5.  And the EPA also “argued . . . that 
the nature of the discharge here [is] significantly different from 
the discharge in Coeur, so as to warrant a different outcome . . . .” 
R. at 9.  This argument indicates the EPA also believes the slurry 
in this case will have a significant impact on the future of Lake 
Temp. Cf. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 526 (“EPA would presuma-
bly not bother with such efforts if it thought emissions reductions 
would have no discernable impact on future global warming.”) (ci-
tation omitted).  Therefore, this Court should reverse the ruling 
of the lower court and hold that the DOD’s § 404 permit for dis-
charging into Lake Temp is invalid because the slurry is not a fill 
material and classifying it as such would violate the stated pur-
pose of the CWA. 
IV. THE DECISION BY THE OFFICE OF 
MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET THAT THE 
CORPS OF ENGINEERS, AND NOT THE 
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, 
25
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HAD JURISDICTION TO ISSUE THE PERMIT 
IN THIS CASE WAS A VIOLATION OF THE 
CLEAN WATER ACT. 
The OMB improperly instructed the EPA not to veto the de-
cision of the COE to issue the § 404 permit to the DOD. R. at 9.  
The OMB’s interference was a violation of the CWA. R. at 9.  The 
CWA tasks the Secretary of the Army and the Administrator of 
the EPA with interpreting and acting upon the relevant statutes 
of the CWA. See 33 U.S.C. §§ 1342(a), 1344(a) (2006).  The CWA 
allocates no such power to the OMB, and the only power it re-
serves to any party other than the COE or the EPA is the power 
it grants the President to grant effluents an exemption from the 
statute for up to one year. See 33 U.S.C. § 1323 (2006).  Not only 
was the OMB’s action improper, but also the EPA’s decision not 
to veto the COE’s grant of the permit was contrary to the intent 
of the CWA.  Therefore, this Court should reverse the decision of 
the lower court and hold that the OMB’s participation in these 
proceedings was improper. 
a. Congress did not provide the Office of Management 
and Budget with the power to make such a decision. 
The United States Constitution requires the President to 
“take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed . . . .” U.S. Const. 
art. II, § 3.  Under that authority, President Jimmy Carter, in 
1978, enacted Executive Order No. 12,088, the purpose of which 
was to ensure that all federal, state, and local agencies comply 
with federally mandated pollution control standards. 43 Fed. Reg. 
47,707 (Oct. 17, 1978).  Section 1-602 of that Executive Order 
states that “[t]he Administrator [of the EPA] shall make every ef-
fort to resolve conflicts regarding [a] violation between Executive 
agencies . . . .  If the Administrator cannot resolve a conflict, the 
Administrator shall request the Director of the Office of Man-
agement and Budget to resolve the conflict.” Id. at 47,708.  But 
the OMB did not simply seek to resolve a conflict in this case; it 
directed the EPA not to exercise its veto power over the COE. R. 
at 9.  This action exceeded the OMB’s authority under Executive 
Order No. 12,088. 
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The lower court correctly noted that “Congress conferred no 
authority directly or indirectly on OMB to issue permits or veto 
permits under 33 U.S.C. §§ [402] or [404] or to decide which per-
mit should be issued in any particular instance.” R. at 9.  OMB 
thus violated the CWA by “directing [the] EPA not to veto the 
permit.” R. at 9.  The “EPA argued to OMB that the nature of the 
discharge here was significantly different from the discharge in 
Coeur, so as to warrant a different outcome, requiring a section 
402 permit at least for treatment of the non-fill liquid and semi-
solid portion of the material before discharge to navigable wa-
ters.” R. at 9.  These facts indicate that the EPA was preparing to 
veto the COE’s decision until it was directed not to do so by the 
OMB, an improper abrogation of the EPA’s veto power. 
b. The decision of the Environmental Protection 
Agency to follow the direction of the Office of 
Management and Budget and not exercise its veto 
power was contrary to Congress’ clear intent with 
the Clean Water Act. 
Under the direction of the OMB, the EPA then chose not to 
veto the COE’s decision, and this decision was also improper.  The 
EPA’s decision is wholly discretionary, and, as the lower court 
correctly noted, “agency action . . . committed to agency discretion 
by law” is not subject to judicial review.” 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2) 
(2006).  The Supreme Court in Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, 
however, stated that the “judiciary is the final authority on issues 
of statutory construction and must reject administrative con-
structions which are contrary to clear congressional intent.” 467 
U.S. 837, 843 n.9 (1984).  Therefore, if the EPA’s decision in this 
case was contrary to Congress’ intent with its enactment of the 
CWA, this Court should reverse the lower court’s decision. 
The EPA’s decision not to exercise its veto power is contrary 
to the intent of the CWA.  The goal of the statute is the “mainte-
nance of [the] chemical, physical and biological integrity of [the] 
Nation’s waters.” 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (2006).  By not vetoing the 
COE’s decision, the EPA is allowing the DOD to discharge pollu-
tants into Lake Temp, thereby compromising the lake’s integrity 
and violating the purpose of the CWA.  Furthermore, Congress 
did not intend for the OMB to interpret and administer the per-
27
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mit system under the CWA; it grants those powers only to the 
COE and the EPA. See 33 U.S.C. §§ 1344, 1342 (2006).  By con-
tinuing under the OMB’s direction, the EPA is allowing the OMB 
to make a decision that Congress explicitly reserved for the EPA. 
See 33 U.S.C. § 1344(c) (2006).  The EPA expressed to the OMB 
that it had reservations about the contents of the slurry, and it 
argued that a § 402 permit should be required for at least some of 
those contents. R. at 9.  If the EPA were to act as Congress in-
tended, it would move forward with its veto power and protect the 
waters of the United States from pollution, as the CWA requires.  
Instead, the EPA is following the direction of an executive agency 
that does not have near the experience that the EPA does in ad-
ministering the CWA, thereby acting contrary to Congress’ wish-
es. 
The OMB’s inexperience with the CWA and its applications 
is more reason why the EPA needs to make its own decision in 
this case.  When addressing similar situations, the Supreme 
Court has refused to grant the OMB authority to overrule an 
agency’s decision when Congress has not expressly provided the 
OMB with any such reviewing power in the relevant statute. See 
Dole v. United Steelworkers of Am., 494 U.S. 26, 39 (1990) (hold-
ing that the OMB did not have the power to determine whether 
an agency should adopt certain measures when Congress had not 
authorized the OMB to do so).  One of the reasons that the Court 
is reluctant to grant the OMB such authority is the same reason 
many scholars argue that the OMB’s involvement in agency deci-
sions should be very limited: the people that make up the OMB 
lack the substantive backgrounds to make sufficiently informed 
judgments in the fields which they attempt to regulate. See Alan 
B. Morrison, OMB Interference with Agency Rulemaking: The 
Wrong Way to Write a Regulation, 99 Harv. L. Rev. 1059, 1066 
(1986).  These scholars are concerned that “OMB’s small staff, 
comprised of economists, lawyers, or public policy analysts, as op-
posed to scientists, pharmacologists, or doctors, is making deci-
sions about regulations that would require scientific determina-
tions or expert judgments.” Pamela M. Foster, A Limit to OMB’s 
Authority Under the Paperwork Reduction Act in Dole v. United 
Steelworkers of America: A Step in the Right Direction, 6 Admin. 
L.J. Am. U. 153, 168 (1992). 
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Here, the OMB is essentially making the determination that 
the DOD’s slurry is a fill material and not a pollutant, but it is 
the EPA that has the necessary expertise to make such a deter-
mination.  Allowing the OMB this interference would not only be 
contrary to Congress’ intent, it would also allow the OMB to 
“abuse its authority at the expense of the public’s well-being.” Id. 
at 166 n.116.  The OMB has abused its authority before, also in a 
way that served to frustrate the purposes of agency regulations 
and to ultimately endanger public health and safety. See id. at 
153 n.2 (listing examples of when the OMB’s interference with 
policymaking has resulted in the endangerment of the public).  
This Court should not allow the same to happen here.  Therefore, 
this Court should reverse the lower court and hold that the 
OMB’s participation in these proceedings was improper, and the 
EPA should be allowed to veto the COE’s decision. 
 
CONCLUSION 
This Court should hold that New Union has standing to bring 
its claims, either under its power to protect its sovereign interests 
or its representative capacity under the parens patriae doctrine.  
Although the lower court was correct in classifying Lake Temp as 
a navigable water, it incorrectly upheld the COE’s jurisdiction to 
issue the permit in this case when it determined that the slurry is 
a fill material rather than a pollutant.  And the OMB’s involve-
ment in the permit process was improper given that Congress 
gave only the EPA the power to decide whether the COE’s issu-
ance of a permit under § 404 is proper.  For the foregoing reasons, 
New Union respectfully requests that this Court reverse the deci-
sion of the district court to grant the Secretary of the Army’s mo-
tion for summary judgment.  This Court should then grant New 
Union’s motion for summary judgment. 
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